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1.  Initial education and labour market performance 
Education is an important determinant of individual labour market performance … 
1.  In OECD economies, people with low qualifications face gloomier employment prospects or, in 
countries where they can price themselves into jobs, a higher risk of being persistently in low pay and often 
in poverty. Employment rates of those with tertiary education are up to three times greater than those of 
workers with less than upper secondary education (Chart 1). In addition, the employment gap between 
high- and low-educated groups seems to be on the rise in many countries (OECD, 2003a, chapter 1). 
Chart 1.  Employment rates by educational attainment, 2002 
… and has a sizable  impact on aggregate employment. 
2.  This impressive gap in labour market performance can partially be explained by the fact that 
employers tend to use education to screen job applicants. High-educated individuals may therefore crowd-
out  their  low-educated  counterparts  by  competing  for  low-skilled  positions,  especially  in  periods  of 
depressed  labour  demand.  However,  there  is  only  limited  evidence  of  crowding-out  in  the 
microeconometric literature. Conversely, there is a strong cross-country correlation between average years 
of education and aggregate employment rates (Chart 2). In fact, recent OECD estimates show that one 
additional year of average education can increase employment and labour force participation rates by up to 
1.7 percentage points (OECD 2004, chapter 4). 
Chart 2.  Employment rates and average years of schooling, 2000 
3.  The  strong  correlation  between  the  average  educational  attainment  of  a  country  and  the 
performance of its labour market is likely to be due to three main factors: 
Education is known to have a strong impact on productivity. 
·  According to OECD estimates, increasing average education by one extra year would raise 
aggregate productivity by about 6% (OECD, 2003b). In turn, the productivity gains can be 
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7  2 
shared by workers (through greater wages) and firms (through greater profits), thereby raising 
both the incentive to participate in the labour market and labour demand. 
The growth of educational attainment can accommodate rising demand for skills. 
·  Unskilled workers have been experiencing an adverse demand shift in the past thirty years, 
compressing their labour market earnings (and therefore their incentive to participate) and/or 
worsening their unemployment prospects, to the extent that the wage structure cannot fully 
adapt.  By  simply  allowing  the  supply  of  human  capital  to  accommodate  demand  shifts, 
education can have a positive impact on aggregate employment rates. 
Education is crucial for competitiveness in high-tech sectors. 
·  Competition in high-tech sectors is fierce. The quality of human resources of one country is 
crucial to maintain its market share in these sectors and attract FDI. Recent OECD estimates 
indeed show that one additional year of average educational attainment in the population 
would increase total stock of inward FDI by 1.9% (Nicoletti et al., 2003). In turn, inward FDI 
might result in strong employment growth, as the Irish experience suggests. 
2.  Adult learning and labour market performance 
But initial education is increasingly insufficient to carry a person through his/her working life 
4.  The  approach  to  human  resource  development  based  on  provision  of  formal  education  and 
vocational training preceding entry to the labour market is increasingly insufficient for at least two reasons. 
First, technological and structural changes render jobs and skills obsolete at such a rate that the slow 
renewal of the labour force through the entry of young qualified workers might not suffice to satisfy the 
demand for new qualifications, thereby increasing the risk of skill shortages that, in a global economy, may 
depress employment. Second, as skills become outdated more quickly than workers retire from the labour 
force, there is a strong risk of older workers losing their current jobs, while lacking the competencies to 
move into new jobs. This might rapidly become a major problem for OECD economies since, due to 
population ageing and the effect of policies aimed at prolonging working life, the bulk of the labour force 
in 10-15 years from now will be composed by individuals who will have completed their initial schooling 
many years before.  
5.  In addition, although learning begets learning, and the productivity of adult training is likely to 
increase with the quantity and quality of initial education, individuals who have entered their working life 
without qualifications might sometimes succeed in reducing their handicap through later investment in 
competence development. 
Adult education and training make individual footholds in employment more secure … 
6.  Workers  maintaining  and  upgrading  their  competences  by  continually  undertaking  training 
during their working life, tends to be in a better position in the labour market, with not only higher wage 
growth but also more secure employment prospects (OECD 2004, chapter 4). Although there are important 
cross-country differences, OECD estimates show that, on average, a 10% increase in the time spent by an 







































7  3 
of being active of about 0.3 percentage points, and b) a fall in the probability of being unemployed of 
almost 0.2 percentage points (Chart 3).  
Chart 3.  Training increases the probability of being active and reduces the risk of unemployment 
… by facilitating the transition from job to job, particularly for displaced workers. 
7.  Incentives to skill formation are particularly important within a strategy of global reform aiming 
at making the labour market more responsive to change. Indeed, a recent OECD study based on data from 
European countries show that workers who have received training in one job move easily to more secure 
and better paid jobs (OECD 2004, chapter 4). In particular, training received during fixed-term contracts 
has a crucial role in making temporary jobs a stepping stone towards open-ended contracts. Similarly, 
workers who receive training during their career are in better position in the event of lay-off, since they are 
more  successful  in  searching  for  a  new  job.  For  instance,  for  a  worker  aged  35  years  or  more,  the 
probability of finding a new job within two years after lay-off is estimated to be 8 percentage points greater 
if he/she took some training in the year before job loss.
1 
3.  Is the investment in adult education and training too low? 
Firms are the main investors in human capital formation of adults … 
8.  Most of the investment in competence formation of adults consists in vocational or informal 
training, while recurrent education is not widespread. Indeed, while 26% of adults (excluding full-time 
students and retirees) of OECD countries participate in some vocational training course every year, only 
4% of them enrol in curricula leading to a formal education diploma (Chart 4).
2 
Chart 4.  Formal education accounts only for a small part of adult learning 
9.  Individuals, however, bear only a small share of the cost of training. Available evidence point to 
the fact that firms are the main investor in human capital formation of adults. Chart 5 shows that in most 
OECD countries, firms fully pay for more than 70% of the vocational training courses of their employees.
3 
Yet, most of this training appears to concern competences that can be successfully used by the recipient in 
other jobs and firms. Moreover, the share of formal education courses — arguably imparting general 
competences — that are paid by firms is also large (about one third; OECD, 2003a, chapter 5). 
Chart 5.  Most training is entirely paid by employers 
…because several constraints limit the investment of individuals… 
10.  Why do individuals pay such a small fraction of the costs of their training? After all, it can be 
argued that, while any gain for the firm is lost upon separation, individuals can benefit from training 
throughout their working life, to the extent that the competences imparted by training are sufficiently 
general and obsolescence is not too large. One reason is that labour market imperfections provide the 
employer with some degree of market power over their trained personnel so that they can afford to pay 
trained workers less than their post-training productivity and still retain them. To the extent that benefits 







































7  4 
11.  Labour market imperfections alone, however, do not suffice to explain why workers often do not 
pay at all for training courses that impart relatively general competences. Capital and training market 
imperfections  contribute  to  explaining  this  apparent  puzzle.  Training  might  not  be  fully  contractible 
because its type and quality are unlikely to be specifiable in a contract in such a way to be verifiable by 
third parties such as tribunals. Consequently, individuals might give up training opportunities because they 
are unable to gauge the quality of the services offered by different providers. By the same token, they 
might therefore refuse to share training costs with their employer, when the latter is the training provider or 
acts as a broker of training services. In addition, benefits from training are uncertain and hard to assess for 
a  single  individual,  for  whom  training  represents  one  indivisible  risky  investment  that  cannot  be 
diversified.  Finally,  the  fact  that  human  capital  cannot  be  used  as  collateral  makes  it  difficult  for 
individuals to finance training through borrowing. 
… but labour market imperfections might prevent them from investing enough 
12.  Labour  market  imperfections induce  firms  to  compensate for  individual  under-investment,  at 
least partially. In fact, employers have an incentive to invest in the human capital of their employees 
because they benefit from it in the form of higher profits — that is, because pay scales do not follow 
closely the increase in productivity brought about by training. However, employees can always accept 
better job offers and quit. Therefore, when employees’ competences are transferable, future employers will 
appropriate part of the benefits of training without having contributed to its costs — a phenomenon that is 
often called “poaching”. To the extent that current employers do not take into account the benefits from 
training that will accrue to future employers, they will tend to invest in training less than the amount that is 
socially desirable (see OECD, 2003a, chapter 5).
4 
Do market imperfections induce marked underinvestment in training? 
13.  How pervasive are the effects of these imperfections on training outcomes? Available evidence is 
mainly indirect and does not allow a conclusive answer. Some evidence on the potential effect of labour 
market  imperfections  has  been  obtained  by  looking  at  the  relationship  between  minimum  wages  and 
training. In fact, minimum wages compress the lower tail of the wage distribution and can therefore be 
expected to reduce overall training investments albeit increasing the share of them that is paid by firms. 
For instance, Neumark and Wascher (2001) estimate that introducing California’s minimum wage in US 
states applying the federal minimum in 1991 — that is an increase of about 10% — would have implied a 
reduction in the amount of training of about 17%. Several other studies on more recent data, however, did 
not find the same relationship in the United States, and even found a positive impact of the introduction of 
the National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom in 1999. Findings based on other measures of labour 
market imperfections seem to confirm a positive relationship (Brunello and De Paola, 2004). For instance, 
many studies seem to suggest that a 10% increase in wage compression might increase training by up to 
20%. 
14.  Does a positive relationship between the degree of labour market imperfections and training 
imply that these imperfections have little bearing for training outcomes? If this were true, no relationship 
whatsoever  should  be  observed  between  labour  market  imperfections  and  training.  By  contrast,  one 
possible  interpretation  of  the  evidence  is  that  training  and  capital  market  imperfections  constrain  the 
capacity of individual employees to invest in training more than what they do for employers. In such a 
case,  in  fact,  individual  investments  are  anyway  low.  Conversely,  the  greater  the  labour  market 
imperfections,  the  greater  the  share  of  training  benefits  employers  can  appropriate,  and  therefore  the 
greater the amount of training they will be ready to pay for as well as the total volume of training provided 








































7  5 
enhancing flexibility in the labour market without complementary reforms in other markets might have 
adverse effect on training. To the extent that comprehensive reforms in other markets are not feasible or 
cannot  be  sufficiently  effective,  specific  training  policies  aiming  at  increasing  firms’  investments  in 
training (to compensate for the poaching externality) can be justified (see below). 
4.  Training inequalities 
Disadvantaged groups would benefit from further training … 
15.  Although recent OECD analysis (OECD, 2004, chapter 4) points out that the estimated impact of 
training on wage growth tend to be larger in the case of relatively young and well educated employees, 
available evidence suggest a much more homogeneous impact on individual employment prospects (Chart 
6). Once foregone income due to unemployment spells is taken into account, it turns out that training is 
likely to have a greater impact on individual earnings.  
Chart 6.  Training has a positive effect on different types of workers 
16.  Are the gains enjoyed by individuals upgrading their skills offset by the losses experienced by 
those who do not participate in training? — i.e. are displacement effects large? Although evidence on this 
question is scant, a recent OECD study (OECD, 2004, chapter 4) finds no evidence that the share of 
recently trained workers within a given labour market group (for instance defined in terms of age and 
education)  significantly  displace  non-trained  workers  in  the  same  group.  In  other  words,  marginally 
increasing participation rates for a given targeted group can be expected to improve aggregate labour 
market performance of the group as a whole.
6 
… but opportunities are unequal across workers 
17.  Empirical  evidence show,  however, that  those  groups  that  receive less  training  have  already 
lower earnings or employment security. For instance, gender differences in education and training are of 
the order of 15% on average (see Chart 7) — that is a figure comparable to the average gender wage gap 
(see OECD, 2002b, chapter 2). Even more striking, older workers and individuals with less than upper 
secondary education receive less than 50% of the volume of training received by an average individual. 
Among employed workers, the same occurs for workers in low-skilled occupations, in small firms or self-
employed, although part of these gaps are probably due to individuals with greater training potentials 
sorting into high-skilled occupations and large firms. As a result, current training patterns risk to increase 
labour market inequality between different worker groups. 
Chart 7.  Training inequalities are significant 
18.  Do firms discriminate among workers when choosing whom to train? Or, are these differences 
due to lack of individual demand? OECD analysis (OECD, 2003a, chapter 5) shows that employers are less 
likely to include women, immigrants, involuntary part-time and temporary workers, workers in low-skilled 
occupations and/or with little basic competences, when selecting which employees to train. The primary 
cause of existing training inequalities is indeed the discriminating behaviour of firms, which might be 
because they expect lower returns from investing in the human capital of these groups (due for instance to 
greater direct training costs, smaller productivity growth induced by training and/or specific constraints 
affecting certain groups).
7 The same applies to employees of small firms and/or in low-tech sectors. In the 
latter case, however, lack of employer support is not due to selection by firms but rather to the fact that 







































7  6 
high-tech firms to reap the benefits from training — e.g. through internal promotion or re-assignment and 
upskilling.  Large  firms  may  also  have  lower  unit  costs  of  training  and  greater  access  to  credit  and 
information. Conversely, the distribution of training by age seems to be the most important exception to 
this pattern, insofar as it appears to be essentially the result of lack of demand from older workers, which 
may be due to shorter pay-back periods and lack of adequate offer by training providers.
8 
5.  The possible approaches to policy action 
Structural reforms are likely to reduce imperfections in the labour market … 
19.  Insofar  as  market  imperfections  are  responsible  for  training  outcomes,  and  that  these 
imperfections are due to institutions and policies, the first-best approach would be to overcome them 
through structural reforms. Within this context, one can expect that product and labour market policy 
reforms envisaged by the OECD Jobs Strategy, by reducing the degree of imperfection of these markets, 
might allow training investments to approach socially optimal levels. For instance, reforms concerning 
barriers to entrepreneurship, employment protection legislation, minimum wages and opt-out clauses in 
collective bargaining, by removing barriers to resource reallocation, reducing mark-ups, and making pay-
scales reflect productivity more closely, are likely to reduce search costs for trained workers and increase 
the share of training benefits that can be appropriated by workers, thereby increasing their incentive to pay. 
…but this might not suffice to improve training outcomes 
20.  In the presence of capital or training market imperfections, however, employees might not find 
themselves in the position to be able to afford and/or accept to increase their share of training financing. 
For instance, credit constraints may create a barrier to training of low-educated (low-income/low-wealth) 
workers or these workers may find it difficult to negotiate with their employers about the content and 
quality of training programmes. Consequently, to the extent that more flexible labour markets — enhanced 
by structural reforms — decrease the share of training benefits that is appropriated by employers and 
increase  the share  potentially  reaped  by  workers,  structural  reforms  might  even  result  in  the  level  of 
training  investment  falling  further  below  socially  desirable  outcomes.  Complementary  reforms  in  the 
capital and training market might help reducing this problem. However, it is still unclear whether structural 
reforms can fully eliminate imperfections in these markets (see below). 
21.  Additionally, some of the labour market imperfections that might affect training outcomes might 
also  not  be  thoroughly  overcome  by  structural  reforms.  For  instance,  training  might  impart  specific 
combinations of skills that are only imperfectly transferable in the sense that only few firms can effectively 
make use of them (Lazear, 2003). If this is the case, although training in these skills increases potential job 
opportunities for the worker, finding them may require a long and costly search process. In turn, this might 
provide greater bargaining power to the current employer, who can appropriate part of the benefits of 
training by paying the trained employee less than his/her productivity, at least in the short term. 
Certain contractual arrangements for cost-sharing can approach the first-best … 
22.  The risk of poaching is the main reason why, when firms pay for a large part of training cost, 
human  capital  investment  might  fall  short  of  optimal  outcomes.  By  defining  codes  of  conduct  that 
discourage poaching, employer associations can establish coordination mechanisms that help reducing the 
importance of this problem (Hall and Soskice, 2001, Wakita, 1998, Blinder and Krueger, 1996). However, 







































7  7 
product market competition.
9 An alternative — and perhaps more efficient — way of overcoming the 
poaching  problem  is  through  contractual  arrangements  that  provide  firms  with  temporary  protection 
against poaching — allowing them to cash-in their share of benefits immediately after the training spell 
while  letting  the  individual  free  to  appropriate  the  remainder  in  the  long-run.  Pay-back  clauses  and 
apprentice contracts fall within this category. 
23.  Statutory or contractual pay-back clauses specify that a worker leaving the firm within a specified 
period after an education or training spell has to agree to reimburse at least part of the training costs 
incurred by the employer. During the period covered by the clause, the employer can contain wage growth 
after training to recoup the cost of training without increasing the risk of quits. But efficient turnover is not 
undermined by this type of clause. Indeed, if the trained employee finds a job in which he/she is more 
productive,  he/she  (or  his/her  prospective  employer)  can  always  reimburse  the  cost  of  training  and 
appropriate  the  extra  benefits.  Similarly,  in  apprentice  contracts,  apprentices  are  paid  less  than  their 
productivity during most of the period covered by the contract, but a recognised qualification is delivered 
at the end, with the apprentice receiving a substantial wage increase if he/she stays with the same firm. 
Like contracts involving pay-back clauses, employers can recoup the cost of training by paying workers 
less than their marginal product in the final stage of the apprenticeship. But contrary to pay-back clauses 
workers can quit before the end of the contract without penalty except that, if they do, they do not receive 
the  final  certification.  For  this  reason,  workers  have  an  interest  to  stay  at  least  until  the  end  of  the 
apprenticeship, but firms have an interest to provide good-quality training to minimise quits.  
 … but only under specific circumstances 
24.  The application of pay-back clauses in training contracts remain however limited, in practice. 
While pay-back clauses are frequent in the case of the expenditures incurred by firms to help new hires 
move to the region in which their new workplace is located,
10 this is less so in the case of training costs. 
For instance, according to a recent study only 15% of German firms have recently used pay-back clauses 
for specific training purposes (OECD, 2003a, chapter 5). One reason might be that standard pay-back 
clauses provide the worker with an incentive to induce the employer to lay them off, insofar as they apply 
only in the case of voluntary quits (Carmichael, 1983). Perhaps more relevant, another reason is that 
employees might be reluctant to sign contracts with pay-back clauses if the training involved does not lead 
to a clearly recognised qualification, since this would imply trading-off bargaining power for a service of 
uncertain quality. Formal education courses are therefore particularly suited to pay-back clauses because 
related expenditures, program content and quality as well as the value of being trained for the employee 
(i.e. the market price for the skills acquired through education) can be easily assessed. But, not all types of 
training have these characteristics.  
25.  Beyond helping defining quality standards and improving information diffusion and guidance 
(see below), public policy can improve the diffusion of these contracts by developing a legal framework 
for their application and setting incentives for their use. For instance, in Luxembourg, pay-back clauses 
apply also in the case of lay-offs for serious fault by the employee. In Germany contractual pay-back 
clauses are enforced by courts only if the quitting employee is estimated to be able to benefit from the 
content of training in the new job. The latter arrangement can be expected to reassure the worker that 
he/she will be liable to pay only when training has effectively enlarged his/her opportunity set, thereby 
increasing his/her incentive to accept such a clause.
11 Still, enforcement of these provisions essentially 
depends on court judgements that might be partially unpredictable. 
26.  Governments can improve the efficiency of apprentice contracts by regulating their duration. In 
fact, a fixed duration prevents firms from poaching other firms’ pool of apprentices in the final stage of 
their  contract.







































7  8 
receive instruction in the specific skills needed to start their career, governments can also allow a more 
efficient diffusion of them by removing age barriers due to age differences in government subsidies — that 
might be unjustified to the extent that prime-age and older workers tend to restart new careers increasingly 
often.  For  instance,  in  Australia,  since  all  age  restrictions  were  removed  from  apprenticeships  and 
traineeships  in  1992,  individuals  aged  25  years  and  over  have  accounted  for  the  majority  of  new 
apprenticeships, but this strong growth has not come at the expense of younger apprentices whose number 
also rose (OECD, 2003c). However, apprentice contracts can be successful only when they lead to a clearly 
recognised qualification, which again drastically limit their scope.  
27.  In summary, contracts with pay-back clauses and apprenticeships can induce agents to approach 
first-best outcomes, under specific circumstances. Specific policies can also improve their effectiveness. 
However, to the extent that these policies cannot thoroughly overcome problems of training contractibility 
and other imperfections in the training market, these contracts are unlikely to improve training outcomes 
under all possible circumstances. 
A case for second-best policies can be made … 
28.  In the light of these considerations, a case for second-best training policies — that is, aiming at 
inducing optimal investment levels given existing labour market imperfections — could be made, provided 
that it is possible to design policies that lead to additional and productive training at reasonable cost. 
Furthermore, second-best strategies allow considering training policy as an additional instrument to reduce 
inequalities in the labour market. This might explain why there is a lot of attention of policy-makers for 
lifelong learning policies despite the lack of conclusive evidence on market failures. Yet, the provisio on 
cost-effectiveness has often received little attention, and the relative efficiency of training policies, with 
respect to other potential instruments, remains largely to be evaluated. 
…but evaluation mechanisms must be built into the policy design 
29.  Well-designed policies should be based on a careful ex-ante quantitative assessment of social 
benefits and costs. But this assessment exercise can be done only on the basis of rigorous ex-post analysis 
of existing policies and there are still too few empirical evaluations of those schemes that have been 
already implemented in different countries. In addition, most of those available are limited to descriptive 
statistics and do not build up counterfactuals against which a rigorous assessment could be made. Well-
designed  policies  must  therefore  include  evaluation  mechanisms  in  their  design  to  ensure  timely 
corrections of policy mistakes. For this reason, in many countries there is an increasing tendency to try 
policy innovations as pilot programs first (possibly with some variation in the design of simultaneous 
pilots), in order to proceed to their evaluation before mass implementation. Albeit a step in the right 
direction, using only pilots to evaluate a programme might be insufficient, however, because there might 
be scale effects that can be difficult to evaluate through small-scale experiments.
13 
Heterogeneous training needs are more easily addressed through the demand side 
30.  To the extent that, in contrast to children in initial education, learning objectives of individual 
adults are ever-changing and very heterogeneous, such needs can best be met through a more differentiated 
arrangement of providers and courses than the delivery mode characterising initial education. For this 
reason, second-best strategies to increase human capital accumulation of adults have shifted from public 
provision and direct subsidisation of external private providers of training services to strategies focused on 








































7  9 
6.  Government-supported co-financing schemes 
Governments can provide financial support to firms’ and individuals’ investments … 
31.  Most demand-side policies consist in government-supported co-financing schemes — that is, 
intended to increase incentives for employers and/or individuals to invest in competence formation through 
a partial contribution to training costs. 
32.  Insofar as current employers might not be able to internalise benefits from training that will 
accrue to future employers, tax arrangements or grant schemes for enterprises have been used by many 
countries to increase aggregate investment. These schemes aim at raising employers’ investment towards 
the socially optimal level by modifying their private cost of training and, with respect to this objective, 
might be effective under certain circumstances (see below). By contrast, it might be very difficult to target 
groups that have less frequent opportunities to receive employer-sponsored training through incentives for 
firms. The reason is that there is a strong risk to induce inefficient substitution among groups to the extent 
that,  in  the  absence  of  the  policy  measure,  the  firm  would  be  almost  indifferent  between  training 
employees belonging to the targeted group or to a subset of non-targeted groups. For example, in one of 
the few rigorous evaluation studies on training policies, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) show that tax 
deductions available to firms training workers aged 40 years or older — introduced in the Netherlands in 
1998 and recently abolished — induced significant substitution between workers above and immediately 
below the age threshold, making the overall efficiency of the scheme questionable.  
33.  When training policy is intended to reduce inequalities in the access to training, the only co-
financing schemes that have some chance of success are those that focus directly on individuals (such as 
loan and individual subsidy schemes), by relaxing borrowing constraints and increasing expected rates of 
return. However, their effectiveness depends on information that workers often do not have. In addition, 
portability of skills must be assured, particularly in the case of training not delivering formal diplomas. As 
a consequence, financial incentives must be accompanied by adequate framework conditions (see below). 
… although any efficient financial incentive must not cover total costs but be a matched contribution 
34.  What counts for individual or employer’s decisions to invest in training is the difference between 
marginal  expected  benefits  and  marginal  training  costs.  Hence,  despite  the  lack  of  rigorous  ex-post 
evaluations, it is still possible to establish two necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for a co-financing 
policy to be efficient: 
·  The subsidy component of a policy package must seek to compensate only the gap between 
marginal  costs  and  marginal  private  benefits  that  may  arise  at  the  socially  desirable 
investment level, leaving to employers and/or employees the responsibility of financing the 
rest. Therefore, whatever its objective, a co-financing policy can approach efficiency only if 
its implicit or explicit subsidy does not cover total costs but is a matched contribution. 
·  Co-financing policies must reduce marginal private training costs for every subsidy recipient. 
A recipient obtaining a lump subsidy, which does not change his/her marginal costs, will not 
modify his/her investment decisions. In such a case, therefore, the subsidy will at best pay for 
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6.1  Financial incentives for firms 
35.  Financial incentive schemes for firms usually take two forms: grants or tax deductions (or their 
combination, such as “train-or-pay” schemes). In addition, these schemes may (or may not) be financed 
through specific training levies. 
36.  There is little a priori ground on which tax deductions can be preferred to grant schemes or vice 
versa, provided that they are designed according to the principles outlined above. For example, in Austria, 
firms can deduct 120% of the cost of training from turnover when determining taxable income. This 
implies reducing marginal costs by 20%, the remaining share being fully paid by firms. Similarly, in no EU 
country, grants awarded by matching national resources with funds from the European Social Fund finance 
more than 50% of training costs, except in special cases (see OECD, 2003a, 2005, for other examples). 
Tax-based schemes have the advantage of building on existing institutional arrangements for taxation, 
allowing them to be applied with limited implementation costs. Conversely, grants awarded through a 
case-by-case analysis of training plans have, in theory, greater probability of avoiding financing training 
that would be undertaken anyway in the absence of the subsidy. For the same reason, targeting problems 
are less important in the case of grants. However, in practice, exploiting the potential of grants requires 
information and competences that are often not sufficiently available within national administrations. In 
addition, their administrative costs are high and, often, their lack of transparency makes them open to 
abuses. 
37.  Another advantage of grant schemes with respect to tax deductions is that grants can be more 
easily financed through a specific levy. Indeed, while grants can be awarded only until exhaustion of the 
resources contained in a specific fund, the use of a levy to finance tax deductions requires estimating the 
reduction in tax revenue that the deduction will imply.
14 This perhaps explains why tax deductions have 
been rarely financed through a specific levy, the only exception being the case of train-or-pay levy/grant 
schemes (adopted for instance in France and the Quebec province of Canada and often advocated in policy 
reports),
15 which require employers to spend up to a certain proportion of payroll on training or pay a levy. 
In practice, however, train-or-pay schemes do not fulfil the necessary conditions outlined above. This is 
because they combine three measures: i) a tax of a given percentage of payroll independent of training 
expenditures; ii) a 100% automatic subsidy of training expenditures up to that percentage of payroll; and 
iii) an additional grant funded by the resources collected through the levy and awarded through case-by-
case analysis of training projects. By covering total costs up to a pre-determined ceiling, train-or-pay 
schemes do not provide a matched contribution to firms that would have spent less than the legal minimum 
in the absence of the scheme and, therefore, “overpay” any increase in training investment they induce. 
Conversely, firms that would have spent up to the legal minimum anyway enjoy a windfall, which does not 
increase their incentives to invest in training.
16  
38.  In  many  cases,  however,  training  generates  considerable  private  returns;  therefore,  efficient 
policies must induce employers (and/or employees) to finance most of its costs. As a general rule, when a 
precise evaluation of social costs and benefits is difficult, it might preferable to focus on co-financing 
schemes with large leverage potential, which have greater scope to minimise costs for the public budget as 
well  as  the  risk  to  finance  training  that  would  have  been  undertaken  anyway.  For  instance,  many 
institutional  arrangements  that  allow  mobilising  substantial  investment  from  employers  can  be 
implemented  with  limited  public  co-financing  (examples  includes  apprenticeships,  time  accounts, 
company-based individual learning accounts, as well as training consortia pooling together resources from 







































7  11 
6.2  Financial incentives for individuals 
39.  As discussed above, to the extent that individuals do not sufficiently invest in training because of 
borrowing  constraints,  public  authorities  can  put  in  place  schemes  —  such  as  loan  guarantees, 
subsidisation  of  interest  payments  and/or  lending  by  public  bodies  with,  possibly,  income-contingent 
repayments — to address the reluctance of private financial institutions to make loans for education or 
training purposes. In principle, loans can be neutral for the public budget, thereby making easier to develop 
large-scale programmes. However, except when these schemes are intended to finance higher education of 
the youth and/or are combined to training leaves, they have proved to be of only limited appeal for adults, 
who tend to be more reluctant than younger persons to finance uncertain investments in human capital 
through loans — perhaps, due to existing debts (e.g. home mortgages), family responsibilities, or shorter 
payback periods in the case of older workers. 
40.  To the extent that loans prove to be ineffective, under-investment of individuals is due to training 
market imperfections that are difficult to address directly (see below) and/or equity considerations suggest 
promoting training investment for certain groups, a case for individual training subsidies can be made. As 
for financial incentives for firms, in the absence of rigorous evaluations, it is difficult to distinguish a priori 
between  different  types  of  schemes  (e.g.  vouchers,  individual  learning  accounts,  grants  from  specific 
funds, etc…). Yet, some judgement can be made on the basis of the principles outlined above: subsidy 
schemes are more likely to be efficient when they are matched contributions that reduce marginal costs of 
training for any subsidy recipient.
17 For instance, the US and Canadian individual learning accounts
18 
typically  imply  a  government  subsidy  smaller  than  100%  (often  a  3  to  1  match,  targeted  on  low-
income/low-wealth households) of the amount saved by the individual for personal development purposes, 
including training (OECD, 2003a, chapter 5). Conversely, vouchers are less likely to be consistent with 
these principles,
19 although they might be justified when precisely targeted on disadvantaged groups (such 
as in the case of the Upper Austria’s voucher scheme for older and low-qualified workers; OECD 2005). 
7.  The need to address further barriers to individual investments 
Policies to co-finance individuals can be wasteful without complementary reforms in the training market 
41.  In many cases, barriers to individual investments are not limited to borrowing constraints. More 
often the main factor discouraging individuals from investing in human capital is the lack of transparency 
of the training market and the consequent uncertainty about returns to training. Policy packages including 
provisions to co-finance individual training needs that do not address training market imperfections might 
result  in  a  substantial  waste  of  public  resources.  Institutional  arrangements  can  increase  actual  and 
perceived training benefits by: i) facilitating information diffusion and providing guidance to potential 
learners; ii) ensuring quality control on the services offered by training providers; and iii) fostering the 
portability of skills through the establishment of clear accreditation systems. 
Institutional arrangements can increase perceived marginal benefits … 
42.  In many cases individuals have only imperfect information on the likely benefits from training, 
are unaware of the variety and quality of training services that are available to them and cannot gauge the 
uncertainty  of  the  returns  from  the  investment.  Information  and  guidance  systems  are,  therefore,  an 
important  piece  for  increased  access  to  adult  learning  and  for  a  better  match  between  demands  of 
individuals and supply by training providers. Their objective is to inform individuals and employers about 
learning opportunities, their practical aspects as well as available incentives. Almost all countries have set 
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of users. However, these databases do not fulfil the guidance function and are clearly insufficient for many 
individuals, especially low skilled adults. Personal support, available either in specific lifelong learning 
information and guidance service centres or in integrated centres, which provides together information and 
guidance services on various matters, can help them reach training opportunities that are adapted to their 
own needs. Taking into account that personal support is however costly. This suggests a two-tier approach 
with free access to basic existing information and fee-paying personal coaching, with public support in the 
case of difficult situations (see OECD, 2005, for examples). 
43.  Providing information and guidance, however, might not be enough: since barriers to entry of 
training providers must be relatively low to allow supply accommodating demand shifts without raising 
costs, a trade-off between prompt responsiveness to demand needs and guaranteeing quality of provision 
might emerge.
20 Therefore, in countries where the provision of adult learning is mainly private, there is a 
case  for  policy  initiatives  to  assure  and  improve  quality  of  provision.
21  This  issue  applies  also  to 
information and guidance services. Indeed, it must be ensured that they are independent of specific interest 
and efficiently serve their stated purpose.
22 
44.  Last but not least, policy packages can increase individual benefits from training, by fostering the 
portability of skills and transparency in the signalling of learning outcomes, so that trained workers can 
better  price  themselves  into  jobs.  Many  countries  have  introduced  standardised  competence-based 
qualification  systems,  according  to  which  acquisition  of  qualifications  is  not  conditioned  to  course 
attendance in vocational training or educational institutions. Under these systems, workers are allowed to 
take individual skill tests independently of the way skills are acquired. Yet, much remains to be done to 
ensure the correct functioning of these mechanisms (OECD, 2003d, 2005). 
… as well as reduce opportunity costs … 
45.  Meeting the training needs of employed individuals may frequently require them to stop working 
for a considerable period of time. In this case, the opportunity cost of training might be high (e.g. foregoing 
current earnings and productivity as well as career prospects with the current employer). But often adults 
do not need to go through the entire curricula of an education or training programme to acquire the skills 
they need. In the case of relatively specific training courses, free entry of training providers may ensure 
that services are tailored on the specificity of individual training needs, subject to the provisio on training 
quality discussed above. In the case of longer and more general curricula, however, recognition of prior 
learning for formative purposes — that is the recognition of other skills and experiences than formal 
qualifications,  so  that  individuals  can  further  develop  their  skills  starting  from  the  actual  level  they 
currently possess — can play a decisive role in reducing the length (and therefore the opportunity cost) of 
education and training. However, although there is large variation in the models of recognition of prior 
learning adopted in OECD countries, little information is available on the numbers of those who benefit 
from it, the extent to which credit is granted, the actual costs of these schemes, as well as their credibility 
among providers and, ultimately, their impact on the quality of studies (OECD, 2005). 
… and foster their division between employers and employees 
46.  If the totality of opportunity costs has to be borne by the employee, constraints due to uncertain 
returns are likely to be frequently binding. In many OECD countries, there are various types of statutory or 
contractual  training  leave  schemes  that  guarantee  employees  the  right  to  return  to  their  jobs  after 
completing the training course as well as institutional arrangements facilitating access to training and 
education on a part-time basis (OECD, 2003a, 2005). These provisions help dampening the risk element of 
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good as his/her current one), and in practice imply sharing part of the opportunity costs with employers 
(who need to either replace the worker or forego his/her productivity on a temporary basis). 
47.  However, only few workers per year usually take a training leave, and most of them are second-
earners, especially women (OECD 2003a, chapter 5). This can perhaps be explained by the fact that, as 
suggested by a recent OECD study (OECD, 2003e), foregone income is as important as time constraints to 
explain insufficient individual investments. To the extent that taking a training leave or moving to part-
time work for study purposes imply giving up an important fraction of one’s own salary, these institutional 
arrangements  are  unlikely  to  reach  large  labour  force  segments,  particularly  low-income/low-wealth 
people,  without  complementary  arrangements  addressing  foregone  income.  Although  government  co-
financing schemes can address this issue,
23 other institutional arrangements to foster cost-sharing among 
employers and employees (such as pay-back clauses, apprenticeships, company-based individual learning 
accounts, time-accounts) can attain the same objective without committing large public resources.
24 
8.  Conclusions: several policy instruments to serve different objectives 
48.  Different training policies can serve different objectives. Institutional arrangements to foster cost-
sharing can efficiently increase access to formal, accredited and well-recognised training with little burden 
for the public budget. Co-financing policies that increase the incentive for firms might reduce the possible 
impact of market failures on aggregate training provision and can be easily financed through specific 
corporate  levies.  However,  these  policies  cannot  reach  those  groups  that  are  less  likely  to  receive 
employer-sponsored  training.  In  this  case,  co-financing  policies  targeted  to  individual  demand  might 
become necessary. However, these policies are expensive and might result in substantial waste of public 
resources if they are not accompanied by interventions to reduce imperfections in the training market. 
49.  Design is, however, crucial, and it is possible to identify some general principles concerning the 
desirable characteristics of training policies. Yet, too little is known on their relative efficiency with respect 
to other potential instruments, due to lack of rigorous evaluation analysis. Hence, taking also into account 
the  methodological  complexity  of  ex-post  assessment  in  this  area,  evaluation  mechanisms  should  be 
included into policy design to ensure timely corrections of policy mistakes. 
NOTES
 
1.  With the available cross-country comparable data, it is difficult to say to what extent greater incidence of 
adult education and training translates into aggregate employment rates. Nevertheless, there is no evidence 
that trained workers thoroughly displace their non-trained peers. Furthermore, the cross-country correlation 
between employee training participation and employment rates is extremely high (more than 40% of the 
cross-country variation in employment rates can be explained by training participation rates alone) even 
controlling for the effect of initial education. 
2.  Major exceptions to this average pattern are represented by Australian and Swedish adults. In these two 
countries  the  share  of  individuals  aged  35  years  or  more  in  the  population  of  those  attending  formal 
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3.  Even when employers alone are reported to pay for training, they may not bear the full cost because 
workers may indirectly pay for these services through wage adjustments and accepting to be trained outside 
normal working hours. The empirical literature reviewed in OECD (2003a) shows, however, little evidence 
that workers accept lower wages to co-finance training, although there is some evidence that workers bear 
some of the opportunity cost of training by accepting to be trained outside normal working hours, but this 
is more the exception than the rule. 
4.  In theory, there are several market mechanisms that may induce employers to de facto internalise the 
benefits that will accrue to future employers. For instance, this will occur if training sufficiently reduces 
the employee’s propensity to quit. However, this does not seem to occur in practice (Brunello and De 
Paola, 2004). 
5.  Other interpretations of the evidence — that do not involve market failures — have been put forward in the 
literature (see Agell and Lommerud, 1997, Moen and Rosen, 2002, and Leuven et al., 2004). 
6.  On the possibility of economy-wide displacement effects see, however, footnote 1. 
7.  Such as those imposed by family responsibilities for women. 
8.  The closer is the age of retirement and the smaller the available time to recoup training costs. However, the 
effect of the expected age of retirement might be greater in the case of workers’ investment than in the case 
of  firms’.  In  fact,  the  firm  must  amortise  the  latter  within  a  relatively  short  period  independently  of 
workers’ age, because its share of training benefits would be always lost upon separation, whatever the 
reason.  
9.  Furthermore, the effectiveness of these mechanisms strongly depends of national institutions that can be 
difficult to shape through policy intervention. 
10.  For example, US corporations such as Electronic Data Systems, General Dynamics, and Northrop require 
employees  to  repay  relocation  costs  if  they  quit  within  a  specified  period  of  time,  usually  1  year 
(Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998). 
11.  Pay-back clauses might also be more viable if stipulated through collective agreements, since trade unions 
are  in  a  better  position  to  monitor  training  contents  than  individual  workers.  In  the  Netherlands,  for 
example, many collective agreements establish pay-back clauses (Waterreus, 2002). 
12.  In  Germany,  the  duration  of  apprenticeships  is  about  3  to  4  years,  thereby  leaving  enough  time  to 
employers to recoup the costs of expensive training. By contrast, in Italy, apprentices are allowed to obtain 
their certification through the accumulation of multiple short-term contracts, thereby entailing a risk of 
inducing low quality cosmetic investment by firms. 
13.  One example is the mass entry of junk training providers subsequent to the introduction of the British 
nation-wide Individual Learning Account scheme, which had not occurred during previous local pilots. 
14.  It is often argued that another advantage of grants with respect to tax deductions is that funds can be 
collected in one year and disbursed in a different year. This might be a desirable feature because, during 
slack periods, the economic cost of foregoing production while training is lowest, but typically firms make 
no profits and cannot take advantage of tax deductions. This disadvantage of tax deductions is, however, 
only apparent. In fact, deductions of training expenditures can be postponed for several years, in a few 
countries, if taxable income is negative. 
15.  For instance, the Kok’s report on strategies to create more employment in Europe states that “Market 
failures may be addressed through measures aimed at […] ensuring a minimum level of investment in 
continuing training by firms. Compulsory financial contributions by all firms, for example as a proportion 
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up to a certain threshold on training or pay a training levy” (Employment Task Force Chaired by Wim 
Kok, 2003, pp.55-56) 
16.  A  more  efficient  policy  package  would  be  obtained,  for  example,  by  combining  a  levy  of  the  same 
percentage of payroll, a partial — that is, less than 100% — tax deduction of training expenditures from 
this  levy  and  an  additional  grant  funded  by  the  resources  collected  through  the  levy.  This  policy 
combination can be fine-tuned as to imply the same incentive effects for firms spending less than the legal 
minimum while yielding greater tax revenue to finance additional projects. Alternatively, another more 
efficient  policy  option  that  can  be  considered  is  the  simple  combination  of  corporate  tax  deductions 
financed through a specific levy up to the same percentage of payroll. 
17.  An  additional  argument  in  favour  of  matched  contributions  is  that  individuals  are  more  likely  to  be 
effective  in  monitoring  service  quality  when  they  have  some  own  resources  at  stake.  Conversely, 
monitoring incentives are weak when the subsidy is intended to cover essentially all costs up to a certain 
limit. 
18.  Such as the state or community-based Individual Development  Accounts in the United States and the 
Learn$ave program in Canada. 
19.  Vouchers usually involve a lump payment that covers training fees up to a fixed ceiling (examples are 
training  vouchers  in  Italy  and  the  Geneva  Canton  of  Switzerland;  ISFOL,  2002,  Conseil  d’État  de  la 
République  et  Canton  de  Genève,  2000).  Therefore,  recipients  who  would  have  spent  more  than  the 
maximum ceiling receive a windfall that does not modify their marginal costs. Conversely, those who 
spend less than the ceiling have no incentive to invest in training yielding high social returns. While the 
latter source of inefficiency can be easily dampened by avoiding that subsidies pay for the totality of 
training costs (for instance, in Upper Austria, vouchers cover only 50% of training costs, except for certain 
groups; OECD 2005), it is more difficult to act on the former to the extent that vouchers entail a ceiling on 
entitlements. 
20.  For example, in the case of the English Individual Learning Account initiative, there is evidence that some 
companies were abusing the system offering low value, poor quality learning. In the case of the levy 
scheme adopted in Australia in the 1990s for a relatively short period, many of the new providers that 
entered after the introduction of the scheme were of dubious quality (OECD, 2003a). 
21.  There  are  only  few  examples  of  such  initiatives.  Although,  most  of  them  are  related  to  co-financing 
policies (such as accreditation of institutions in which vouchers can be spent; OECD 2003a, 2005), they 
define “quality seals” that help users recognising high-quality providers.  
22.  In Germany, as a tentative solution to this problem, there exists a system of accreditation of information 
and guidance providers (OECD, 2005). 
23.  The success of the Belgian and the Swedish schemes (with about 1% of the employees on training leave 
each year) can be attributed to the relatively high replacement rate guaranteed by co-financing schemes. 
However, while foregone wage and training costs are fully covered by a subsidy in Belgium (up to a 
ceiling), making the system extremely costly for the public budget, the Swedish scheme guarantees only a 
relatively small allowance, which can be complemented through income-contingent loans (OECD, 2003a, 
chapter 5).  
24.  The individual learning account scheme adopted by Skandia, a Swedish private insurance company, is 
particularly interesting in this respect. If employees save on a savings account, the company also pays 
contributions onto a parallel account. If that individual then makes use of his/her right to training leave 
(which in Sweden cannot be refused by the employer), the money accumulated on both accounts is used to 
finance continuous payment of wages. Employees can save up to 10% of annual salary per year with their 
contributions taken out of before tax income. The employer matches individual contributions on a 1:1 
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company contributions are increased to a 3:1 match up to 20% of annual salary per year. While employees 
retain the right to eventually choose their training, the high share of the investment borne by the company 
is motivated by the fact that the accounts work in practice as an incentive device, which minimises quits 
and  enhances  long-term  specific  investments  from  the  employee.  Furthermore,  the  company  provides 
guidance on the choice of training programmes, thereby aligning individual demands on the company’s 
needs. In the first two years that the Skandia project has been running, 40 per cent of employees have 
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a) Low-skilled correspond to Less than upper secondary education (ISCED 0/1/2). High-skilled correspond to Tertiary education (ISCED 5/6/7).
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a) 1998 for Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and Spain; 1999 for Austria and the Netherlands.
Source: Nicoletti et al. (2003)
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a) Percentage-point impact of a 10% increase in the number of years in which an average individual receives some education or training. Data refer to individuals aged 25-44 years.
Source: Update of Secretariat calculations made for OECD (2004) on the basis of the European Community Household Panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994-2000) for the European countries and on the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youths 1979 for the United States (1992-1998).
Panel A. Estimated change in the probability of being unemployed as a result of training or education, prime-age workers 
a
Panel B. Estimated change in the probability of  participating in the labour market as a result of training or education, prime-age workers 
a
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a) Persons aged 26-65, excluding those in full-time education or retired.
Source: IALS.
b) Weighted average of Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Chart 4.  Formal education accounts only for a small part of adult learning
Annual participation rates in and hours per head
a of job or career-related training courses, weighted average of available countries, 1994-1998
b
Participation rates
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%
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b) Unweighted average of countries shown.
c) Flanders only.
Source: OECD (2003a).
a) Data refer to vocational training (both employer-sponsored and non-employer-sponsored) received by employed persons aged 26 to 65 years and to 
1994 for Canada, Ireland, Poland, Switzerland (German and French-speaking regions) and the United States, to 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders 
only), New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and to 1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking 
regions of Switzerland. Countries are ranked from left to right in ascending order.
Chart 5. Most training is entirely paid by employers













































































a) Percentage-point impact of a 10% increase in the number of years in which an average individual receives some education or training. Data refer to individuals aged 25-44 years.
Source: Update of Secretariat calculations made for OECD (2004) on the basis of the European Community Household Panel, waves 1 to 7 (1994-2000) for the European countries and on the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the United States (1992-1998).
Panel A. Estimated change in the probability of being unemployed as a result of training or education, by labour market group 
a
Panel B. Estimated change in the probability of  participating in the labour market as a result of training or education, by labour market group 
a
Chart 6. Training has a positive effect on different labour market groups
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a) Persons aged 26 to 65, excluding those in full-time education or retired.
Source: IALS.
Chart 7. Training inequalities are significant
Average hours of education and training for selected groups as a percentage of the average for all groups
 a b 
b) Weighted average of Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
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